

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

CLARENCE W. TRENT,

Plaintiff,

-against-

MARK K. PEDDYCOART, SHIELD 4021;  
TIMOTHY McGUIRE, SHIELD 1222; VITO  
GAZZOLA, SGT.,

Defendants.

22-CV-4110 (LTS)

TRANSFER ORDER

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Clarence W. Trent, who is currently incarcerated at Sing Sing Correctional Facility, brings this action *pro se* alleging that on August 17, 2017, during the course of his arrest, Defendants violated his rights in Mastic (Suffolk County), New York.<sup>1</sup> For the following reasons, the Court transfers this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.

**DISCUSSION**

Under the general venue provision, a federal civil action may be brought in:

(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred . . . ; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.

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<sup>1</sup> This Court does not make any determination regarding the timeliness of Plaintiff's claims but notes that the statute of limitations for claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is found in the "general or residual [state] statute [of limitations] for personal injury actions." *Pearl v. City of Long Beach*, 296 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting *Owens v. Okure*, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989)). In New York, that period is three years. *See* N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). Section 1983 claims generally accrue when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of the claim. *Hogan v. Fischer*, 738 F.3d 509, 518 (2d Cir. 2013).

Under Section 1391(c), a “natural person” resides in the district where the person is domiciled, and an “entity with the capacity to sue and be sued” resides in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1), (2).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, who are members of the 7th Precinct of the Suffolk County Police Department (SCPD), violated his rights in Mastic (Suffolk County), New York, which is located in the Eastern District of New York. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 112(c). Plaintiff does not plead the residence of any of the Defendants but provides the SCPD 7th Precinct address for each Defendant. While it is unclear whether this Court would be an appropriate venue for this action under Section 1391(b)(1), because the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in Suffolk County, it is clear that the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York is a proper venue for this action under Section 1391(b)(2).

Even if it were proper for this Court to consider Plaintiff’s claims, transfer of this action appears to be appropriate. The Court may transfer claims “[f]or the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). “District courts have broad discretion in making determinations of convenience under Section 1404(a) and notions of convenience and fairness are considered on a case-by-case basis.” *D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener*, 462 F.3d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 2006).

In determining whether transfer is appropriate, courts consider the following factors: (1) the convenience of witnesses; (2) the convenience of the parties; (3) the locus of operative facts; (4) the availability of process to compel the attendance of the unwilling witnesses; (5) the location of relevant documents and the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (6) the relative means of the parties; (7) the forum’s familiarity with the governing law; (8) the weight accorded

to the plaintiff's choice of forum; (9) trial efficiency; and (10) the interest of justice, based on the totality of circumstances. *Keitt v. N.Y. City*, 882 F. Supp. 2d 412, 458-59 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); *see also N.Y. Marine and Gen. Ins. Co. v. LaFarge No. Am., Inc.*, 599 F.3d 102, 112 (2d Cir. 2010) (setting forth similar factors). A plaintiff's choice of forum is accorded less deference where plaintiff does not reside in the chosen forum and the operative events did not occur there. *See Irigorri v. United Tech. Corp.*, 274 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 2001).

Under Section 1404(a), transfer appears to be appropriate in this case. The events giving rise to Plaintiff's claims occurred in the Eastern District of New York, and any relevant documents and witnesses are likely located in that judicial district. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the Court concludes that it is in the interest of justice to transfer this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. *See* § 1404(a); *see D.H. Blair & Co.* 462 F.3d at 106.

### CONCLUSION

The Clerk of Court is directed to transfer this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. Whether Plaintiff should be permitted to proceed further without prepayment of fees is a determination to be made by the transferee court. A summons shall not issue from this Court. This order closes this case.

The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore *in forma pauperis* status is denied for the purpose of an

appeal. *Cf. Coppedge v. United States*, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).

SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 31, 2022  
New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain  
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN  
Chief United States District Judge